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NUTRITION AND HYDRATION:
MORALCON~DERATIONS

A Statement of The

Catholic Bishops of Pennsylvania
Foreword

It is well known that there has been a great deal of discussion at every
level in our Church and in society at large concerning "advance medical
directives." These issues are already having a profound effect on the way in
which we live. They inj7uence not only our loved ones who are dying. but
the very manner in which we view human life in general. Since all of us are
mortal. these are issues which will also have an immense impact on each of
us personally.
Because of this. the Catholic Bishops of Pennsy lvania have collaborated
in the composItion of the following statement which is an effort on our part
to fulfill our responsibilities as bishops to give guidance to all the Catholic
faithful of this state who are entrusted to our care. It is also our hope that
these observations and the principles on which they are based will be of help
to all who recognize the importance of deliberating at length on the moral
aspects ofthe difficult question ofprovidingfood andj7uids to patients. Our
statement is intended to express. as well as we are currently able. the
teaching ofthe Catholic Church as it affects these admittedly difficult cases.
As we here profess our faith that all human life is sacred since it comes
from God. we pray that all who read our statement willjoin us in our resolve
truly to care for those in need among us.
Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua
Archbishop of Philadelphia
The Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe
December 12. 1991
Introduction

Recent court decisions and the enactment of federal and state laws
governing advance medical directives (living will or durable power of
attorney) have given many the impression that anything the courts of the
civil laws allow is morally acceptable. The issue of the withholding or
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in particular has become
controverted. We, as Catholic Bishops and fellow Pennsylvanians, hope
that what follows will be of help to many of those who are confused about
the present situation, but we especially seek to offer guidance to the
Catholic faithful entrusted to our pastoral care.
God's plan for humanity is not the blindness of a predetermined fate, but
a plan oflove involving all human beings, not as objects but as participants.
The call to respond to the moral law is not a call to legalistic obedience; it is
the call to live those actions and intentions which enable us to share eternal
happiness. "The highest norm of human life is the divine la w itself - eternal,
objective, and universal - by which God orders, directs, and governs the
8
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whole world and the ways of the human community, according to a plan
conceived in his wisdom and love. God has enabled man to participate in
this law of his so that, under the gentle disposition of divine Providence,
many may be able to arrive at a deeper and deeper knowledge of the
unchangeable truth."l
The teaching authority of the Church is not an exercise in legal power.
Rather, it is given to the Church so that she can exercise her sacred
obligation to penetrate and proclaim the truth, to know the reality of God's
plan for our salvation and to set us free to discover and enjoy that which in
the end will make us most happy. The attainment of that end involves faith,
but it is not a totally blind faith nor is this moral law simply a series of flat
commands. God calls us as we are - as his children capable of responding
to him in love and with ever deepening understanding. The function of the
Church, therefore, is not simply to command but also to persuade, and to
do so out of a love and concern which mirrors the love and concern of God
himself.
The sources of moral teaching are divine revelation and the use of our
God-given ability to reason and to come to the truth. Reason and faith are
intimately related and that relationship is evident in the topic that we now
address. Medical practice deals with the most basic issues of life and death,
issues that concern the health, w~ lfare and even the salvation of humanity.
The vocation to care for the life and health of others is to call to serve the
most basic good of every person - life itself. True concern for ·health
involves not only the welfare of the body, but the deepest welfare· of the
whole person. It should come as no surprise that the very best medical care
and the application of the highest moral principles will inevitably coincide
and can never be in conflict with each other.
Life and death decisions are a matter of concern not only to those
immediately affected by them but to everyone of us as well. As Catholic
Bishops it is our responsibility to present the teaching of the Church in
moral matters, since we are charged with the dut y of providing pastoral
guidance for the faithful who must live the Christian message in
contemporary society.
In 1980, the Magisterium addressed the general question of euthanasia in
the decree of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Jura et Bona.
That degree enunciates certain important principles applicable to the
present discussion, but it does not address the specific issue of the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. On one hand, we are clearly obliged
as Catholics to adhere to the guidance of the Magisterium. On the other
hand, the present complex issue has not yet been explicitly dealt with by
the Holy See. That simple fact, however, does not mean that the faithful are
free to act as though there were no guidelines at all. This is all the more
reason why the present intervention on our part has been thought
necessary.
The purpose of our statement is multiple. (I) We wish to offer guidance to
Catholics involved in decision making, especially pastors of souls, those
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in the health-care profession and its beneficiaries. (2) We wish to offer our
teaching as a way of engaging in a dialogue of public policy as it affects all
those involved with legislative and judicial decisions. (3) We wish to present
the developed tradition of a medical ethic which for centuries has guided
doctors and patients alike to achieve the highest standards of health care and
moral good . As Bishops we speak as official teachers and spokesmen for the
Church , but we speak also as citizens concerned with the welfare of all in our
society.
This issue is basic - the care for and preservation of life itself. Modern
medicine offers us modes of care and cure once undreamed of, but such
advances also raise serious questions demanding essential decisions. Many
question whether they must initiate or continue various medical treatments.
They wonder if and when it is allowable to stop even the basics of life, such as
food and water. Court decisions and proposed legislation on living wills
make these issues timely, even though they cannot be resolved on legal
grounds alone, since they have an inescapable moral significance as well.
Bioethics based on philosophy and legal principles provide some guidance
through the maze of problems in health care. 2 Yet it is also clear that
philosophy and law alone do not adequately address all of the real concerns
and pertinent issues. Religious bioethics makes an invaluable contribution to
contemporary moral debates by offering insights into human nature, the
purpose of life, the meaning of suffering and education to true virtue. These
considerations assist doctors and patients alike to make wise choices both in
everyday practice and in the most difficult of cases. Religiously grounded
bioethics leads people to place their attention on the right thing to do and
frees the autonomy of choice from a vision which can easily become narrow
and even dreadfully wrong. We can humanize the face of technology by
giving it a moral evaluation in reference to the dignity of the human person,
who is called to realize the God-given vocation to life and love. 3
State of the Question
Modern medicine continues to deal with age-old questions, even though
current knowledge and technologies offer treatments and procedures that
would once have been impossible. One such area is the supplying of nutrition
and hydration to patients who are incapable of feeding themselves and are
unable to take nourishment orally even with assistance. It is now possible to
sustain the lives of such patients with a variety of techniques, and so arises the
question of the moral obligation to do so. This question of moral obligation
touches not only the patient, who has primary responsibility for the
reasonable care of health and life, but also those who have responsibility for
the patient who is no longer able to exercise self-determination.
The possibilities of sustaining life for extended periods of time raise other
questions. Is it possible not only to keep a patient alive, but even to sustain
apparent vital signs in patients who are in fact dead? There is ordinarily a
moral obligation to do what can reasonably be done to sustain life. There is
no similar obligation to sustain apparent vital signs in a patient who is
10

•

Linacre Quarterly

already dead . In the past these questions would not have arisen. The patient
who was incapable of taking nourishment , especially the unconscious patient,
would have died. At present, however, we have a whole array of methods by
which life support can be supplied even for those who are unconscious.
Decision making is further complicated by questions in regard to
determination of death with a view to using organs as material for
transplants into other patients. There are questions about the continued
cost of long sustained unconscious life in view of the use of time, effort and
resources that could otherwise be ·directed to care or treatment for other
types of patients. There are questions also about the condition of
unconscious patients (in terms of pain and suffering) and about the grief
and suffering of family members who witness the process and who may
participate in their care - sometimes for months or even years.
Determination of Death

Even though theology may describe death as the separation of body and
soul, 4 this separation is not itself visible and directly verifiable. The Church
has always had to rely on the use of medical signs or symptoms to determine
just when death has occurred. Until recently these signs were simple
enough: cessation of heart beat, cessation of respiration, fixed and dilated
pupils, no sign of conscious response to external stimuli. We now
sometimes find the need for other signs as well. Patients who exhibit.all of
the classical signs but who have also experienced severe hypothermia
(lowering of body temperature) have been resuscitated even after periods of
time that would once have been fatal. Other patients who would have
exhibitM all of the classical signs do not do so, because they have been
attached to respirators or heart-lung machines which supply oxygen and so
sustain the vital signs for some time even after true death may have
occurred. This has led to the medical need for other signs in addition to
those previously universally used. The development of additional criteria is
perfectly understandable even from a theological point of view, since it is
still the effort to determine the definitive moment of separation of body and
soul by means of signs and symptoms.
Advances in diagnosis and in the determination of death have also led to
a more exacting distinction between death and various types of
unconsciousness. 5 In the effort to find clear indications of death, inedicine
has developed criteria for brain death. These criteria have developed
especially from the need to determine, as closely as possible, the moment of
death in organ donors so that the organs may be used as soon as possible
before serious decomposition begins.
In most cases the classical criteria are sufficient to determine the fact that
death has occurred. Some patients, however, may be alive but do not show
signs of life (e.g., victims of hypothermia or those under the influence of
barbiturates or anesthetizing or paralyzing drugs). Others may be dead and
yet show what appear to be vital signs (e.g., patients who are attached
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to life support equipment). In the former, life support equipment may be
required until their condition can be determined. In the latter, the necessity
for any treatment or life support has ceased. In either case there mus.t be an
honest effort to determine whether the patient is dead or alive . This is the
purpose behind the move to the brain death criteria.
The norms generally adopted in medical care and in the Uniform
Determination of Death Act 6 (which, in variously modified forms, has been
legislated in many states) are variations of the "Harvard criteria."7
Moralists have generally accepted these criteria as valid for our present state
of knowledge of the nervous system, although newer information may lead
to revision, just as new information led to the need for modification of
earlier criteria. 8
. If the fact of death can be thus determined , then there is no moral
obligation to continue medical treatment or care of any kind , since the
person is dead. However, what concerns us here is the treatment that must
be given to those who are not dead but who, for whatever reason, cannot
supply their own nourishment.
States of Unconsciousness9
All states of unconsciousness are often referred to (even by medical
personnel) as "coma." This is, in fact, not a correct designation. 10 Coma is
but one type of impaired consciouness. There are also others which we
should consider because all of them present situtions in which problems
may arise in terms of the supplying of nutrition and hydration.
A true coma is a state of "unarousable unresponsiveness" with no
response to external stimuli. The person is not dead, but is in a state of sleep.
This condition is never permanent. I I It may last as long as six months, but it
will resolve itself into some other state. The person may emerge into
consciousness again or sink into another state, such as that which is referred
to as the persistent vegetative state. It may take some time, even months, to
diagnose the exact condition.
The persistent vegetative state (PVS) is deeper than a coma. The coma is
a state of sleep; PVS is a form of deep unconsciousness. The cerebrum, the
upper part of the brain, gives evidence of impaired or failed operation
- and it is this portion of the brain, in its cortex or outer layer, which is
responsible for those activities that we recognize as specifically human. 12
Another portion of the brain, the brainstem, is, however, still functioning in
the PVS patient. It is this portion of the brain which controls involuntary
functions such as breathing, blinking, involuntary contractions, and cycles
of waking and sleep. Thus PVS patients may open their eyes and sometimes
follow movement with them or respond to loud and sudden noises
(although these responses will be neither long sustained nor apparently
purposeful). There will be cyclical stages of sleeping and waking, but such
activity is a function of the brainstem and is not an indicator of purposeful
human activity. 13
12
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PVS is sometimes referred to as "cerebral death." This is an unfortunate
terminology, since it seems to imply that there is "brain death" as described
earlier. This is not true. There is a failure offunction at one level in the brain,
but not all, and the person in PVS is definitely not dead. Even medical
personnel sometimes refer to such a patient as "brain dead." This is simply
not the case. 14
There is also a state which is referred to as psychiatric pseudocoma. This
is a state of unconsciousness caused by shock or trauma which leads the
victim to close off from the outside world. This may be so severe as to give
the appearance of death, but it is not even truly a state of unconsciousness .
It is simply total lack of response.
Finally, there is another condition which is referred to as the lo cked-in
state. This condition is caused by an interruption in the descending motor
pathways of the nervous system. "In this condition, paralysis, not cognitive
failure, leads to a lack of ability to communicate."15 The patient is fully
conscious, but simply has no way in which to indicate conscious response.
(In some cases, however, depending on where the motor pathways are
interrupted, communication may be possible by such means as coded eye
blinking.) It takes careful diagnosis not to mistake this patient for the PVS
patient. PET scans can distinguish between the locked-in state and the
persistent vegetative state. The EEG, however, cannot do so, since the
patient in the locked-in state may show an abnormal response, while the
PVS patient may produce readings that are near-normal. 16 Patients who
have recovered from this condition reveal that they were indeed conscious
and well aware of what was going on around them - and had a strong
desire to continue to live.
In none of these classes of unconscious patients are we dealing with the
dead. All of them are alive and some of them may well be expected to
recover. The one case in which recovery becomes most unlikely is that of the
PVS patient, and it is this patient who is likely'to become the object of
decision making in regard to continued treatment or care, or supplying of
nourishment.
Ordinary and Extraordinary Means of Care 17

The Catholic moral tradition holds that one is morally obliged to use the
ordinary means of sustaining life, but is not obliged to make use of
extraordinary means . IS Ordinary means are those which are available and
do not require effort, suffering or expense beyond that which most people
would consider appropriate in a serious situation. This would include most
of the developed procedures and techniques commonly practiced in
medicine and surgery. However, moralists recognize that there are also
subjective elements which influence our ability to make moral judgments.
Subjective considerations of pain, expense and personal abhorrence may
act as obstacles to the fulfillment of this obligation. Furthermore, not all
techniques have to be used in every instance. What would usually be
February, 1992

13

ordinary means may, in certain cases, offer little hope of success and may
prove more burdensome than beneficial to the user. In such situations one
would not be morally obliged to use such means. 19
The distinction between ordinary means (which we are morally obliged
to use) and extraordinary means (which we may choose to use, but are not
obliged to) is not based solely on the commonness and availability of the
means themselves, although this is taken into account. It is also based on the
results that one can expect and on certain serious subjective considerations
and attitudes as well. It takes into account the proportion between benefit
and burden.
Principles of Decision Making

Decisions on the use of appropriate means for the preservation of life and
health can sometimes be complex. One way in which to approach them is to
ask questions which can illuminate the process and direct the questioner to
the best sources for the answers. Those sources involve moral teaching,
medical information and the concrete condition and means of the patient
and the patient's family . What is being suggested here applies as a help to
the decision making process for all patients, including both the conscious
and the unconscious. Obviously, however, the process for the unconscious
patient will involve the use of some sort of "substituted judgment."2o
Is the procedure beneficial to the patient in terms of preservation oflife or
restoration of health? Is it serving a life-saving purpose? Is it adding a
serious burden? Is death already imminent, so that the proposed treatment
may add briefly to the life span in such a way as simply to prolong the dying
process without actually preserving life? Questions such as these must be
directed to experts in the field of medicine, although in difficult cases even
the experts may presently be unable to give final answers to all questions.
Is the procedure a grave burden to the patient, and has that burden
become unbearable or intolerable? No one can actually answer that
question except the patient or, perhaps, the patient's family. At the same
time, suffering is a part of every life and has a spiritual and salutary
significance. Judgments in this area must be tempered by the presence ofthe
varying degrees of depression that any suffering patient or family may be
experience. They may need help in overcoming the temptation simply to
give up. At this point the pastoral counselor may be of considerable
assistance. We must still recognize, however, the subjective aspect of
"unbearableness" and must respect moral judgments made in good
conscience.
If the patient is not competent, then who is to make this sort of judgment?
What motives will enter into that decision? Here again the pastoral
counselor can be of considerable help and so too is the intimate knowledge
that family members might be excepted to have of the patient.
We must also realize that moralists and medical personnel may not
always be using exactly the same definitions of ordinary and extraordinary
14

Linacre Quarterly

means. Medical personnel often use the terms to refer to the means of
treatment in themselves, considering them ordinary unless they are
experimental or rarely used . The moralist must also take into account those
other elements mentioned earlier, that is, the burdens and benefits the
particular treatment may have for the patient or for others. 21 Thus the
moral terminology is usually more related to the condition of the patient,22
while the medical terminology is more related to the technique itself. The
moral judgment is based on the benefit of the technique for the patient as
compared to the accompanying burden, and not simply on the availability
of the technique. Clarity on this point can help to remove one source of
confusion.
Decision makers should also be aware that the decision to terminate a
treatment is usually not morally different from the decision not to initiate
that treatment in the first place. The same moral norms apply in each
instance, but there are circumstantial differences. When treatment is
initiated, the prognosis may not yet be clear. No one is able to predict the
future course of events. The more definitive the prognosis, the more easily
the moral norms can be applied in a concrete manner. However, it may take
considerable time to determine that a patient has entered into a persistent
vegetative state. The duration of unconsciousness itself is an important
determinant in both diagnosis and prognosis. Maximum treatment is
required in the earliest stages, while full or partial recovery still remains a
greater possibility. Even the location or extent of brain or brainstem
damage may not be an accurate indicator in every instance. Time and
treatment are both required. In general, the younger the patient, the more
likely is recovery. After three months the chance of recovery always lessens.
Recovery after six months of the vegetative state is probably less than I in
100, and after twelve months almost never. 23
It is most often when the treatments have run their course and the patient
is clearly not going to recover that the decisions must be made. Prognosis
and the condition of the patient may be clearer than they were at first. Even
then, there is still a serious obstacle to easy decision making. No matter how
clear the case may be by the time a decision is made, the decision to
withdraw a treatment or some form of care already in progress is
psychologically more difficult, since it is always hard for the survivors not to
feel that its withdrawal was the cause of death.
Provision of Nutrition and Hydration
Feeding Methods
There are various ways to supply nourishment to the unconscious. The
general categories would include at least these three: Oral feeding, enteral
feeding and parenteral feeding.
Ora/feeding simply means that food (which may be pureed) or drink can
be placed in the mouth and the patient will then swallow it. For some
patients, even in the persistent vegetative state, this may be enough,
February, 1992
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provided that the swallowing reflex is sufficiently unimpaired . At times,
however, the medical staff will prefer not to use this method, even in cases
where it could be used, since it can be quite time consuming for a staff that
may already have a large number of patients to care for. 24
Enteral (within the bowel)feeding means that the nourishment is placed
directly into the upper end of the small intestine. This can be accomplished
by means of a nasogastric (through the nose and into the stomach) or
nasoduodenal (through the nose and into the upper end ofthe small bowel)
tube, or it can also be done through a gastrostomy (an opening directly into
the stomach) or jejunostomy (an opening into the upper part of the small
bowel). This method does not usually result in complications and, even if
some complications do arise, they are usually not of a serious nature,25 but
the method does presuppose that the gastro-intestinal tract is intact and
functioning.
Parenteral (outside the bowel) feeding refers to the supplying of
nourishment intravenously. This may be done when the gastro-intestinal
tract is not intact or does not function. It may be accomplished for a short
time by means of tubes inserted into the peripheral veins (e.g. , in the arms or
legs), but this can easily lead to thrombosis (clotting). Therefore, if it is to be
used for longer periods, it is done by inserting a tube into the central venous
system,26 There is need for daily monitoring of nutrients, waste products
and blood chemistry until the patient becomes stable, after which
monitoring can be less frequent . This method of nutrition also carries with
it greater risks of complications. Metabolic complications may arise,
resulting in bone disease, liver dysfunction or other problems. There may
also be nonmetabolic complications, such as thrombosis or the
introduction of infecting organisms. However, the relative simplicity ofthis
method is evidenced by the fact that in some situations it has been used as a
form of home care allowing some types of conscious patients to resume
many of their normal activities.
Decisions in Relation to Nutrition and Hydration
There are instances in which it is relatively easy to apply moral principles
to the decision to withhold or withdraw nutrition. In the case of a terminal
cancer patient whose death is imminent, for instance, the decision to begin
intravenous feeding or feeding by nasogastric tube or gastrostomy, may
also mean that the patient is going to endure greater suffering for a
somewhat longer period of time - without hope of recovery or even
appreciable lengthening of life. Weighing the balance of benefits versus
burdens makes it relatively easy to decide that this could fall into the
category of extraordinary means and that such feeding procedures need not
be initiated or may be discontinued.
We are faced with a different set of questions when we begin to examine
the case of the long-term patient who must be fed by some of the means
described above (i.e., those more complicated than assisted oral feeding).
16
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The question of patients in the persistent vegetative state is particularly
important. There is no question here of "brain death," even though that
term is so frequently misused in the media (who cannot always be expected
to know better) and by medical practitioners (who certainly ought to know
better). The PVS patient is alive, but unconscious and , therefore, unable to
take nourishment without assistance . It is clearly not a question of deciding
to stop treatment because the patient has died .
Questions relative to the supplying of nutrition and hydration are often
qualified by the term "artificial." The discussion thus tends to center on
whether artificial nutrition and hydration are to be continued or not in
certain cases. It is not, howev'er, the question of whether a type of care is
artificial or natural that makes the difference in terms of its continuance or
discontinuance. The fact is that every mode of taking in food and drink is, to
some extent, artificial. This is the case whether we speak of the patient
receiving parenteral feeding or the honored guest at a banquet for royalty
- a banquet which observes every nicety of the most sophisticated table
manners and requires a certain expertise in the recognition of all
appropriate cutlery. Both situations provide nourishment and both also use
some artificial means to supply it. The real question, when it comes to
decision making for the unconscious patient, depends in the final analysis
on something other than a distinction between artificial and natural means.
If the supplying·of nutrition and hydration is of benefit to the patient and
causes no undue burden of pain or suffering or excessive expenditure of
resources, then it is our duty to take and to provide that nutrition and
hydration. If the burdens ' have far surpassed the benefits, then our
obligation has ceased.
A distinction is also often made between treatment and care. In the case
of the patient in the persistent vegetative state, some would hold that we are
obliged to continue to supply the proper care, but are not obliged to
continue treatment. 27 The reason for this statement is that treatment in this
instance is no longer useful in resolving the unconscious state of the patient.
For many, then, it becomes a question of whether feeding constitutes
treatment or care. If the former, then it may be discontinued. If the latter, it
must continue. Statements by the Pontifical Council on Health Affairs and
the Pontifical Academy of Sciences both hold to this distinction and say
that treatment may be discontinued, but they then go on to explain that they
view the supplying of nutrition and hydration as care - which must,
therefore, be continued (presupposing, of course, the distinctions already
made in reference to the question of excessive burdens).28
There is, however, another way to look at this. In the case of the
imminently terminal patient one would suppose that treatment is intended
to reverse the course ofthe disease or, at least, to better the condition of the
patient. If it no longer does that, then its discontinuance is no more than a
clear recognition of its futility . Even feeding methods other than oral thus
become futile and can be stopped so as to attend more to the comfort of the
one who is dying. In certain clearly defined cases, then, even certain types
February, 1992
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of care might become extraordinary if they were futile or excessively
burdensome.
However, the patient in the persistent vegetative state is not imminently
terminal (provided that there is no other pathology present). The feeding
- regardless of whether it be considered as treatment or as care - is serving
a life-sustaining purpose. Therefore, it remains an ordinary means of
sustaining life and should be continued. In other words, the mere
distinction between treatment and care does not of itself resolve the moral
problem. Rather, its resolution still remains within the scope of the usual
norms of ordinary and extraordinary means. Whether it is viewed as
treatment or care, it would be morally wrong to discontinue nutrition and
hydration when they are within the realm of ordinary means.
What obligations, then, do exist? The moral obligation to preserve life
and .health falls immediately on the one whose health it is. Is one morally
obliged to submit to procedures to supply nutrition and hydration? Or are
they in the category of extraordinary care, and therefore not obligatory? Of
course, in the case of the PVS patient, these decisions will be made by
others, since the patient is incapable of making them. Obviously, the
primary focus should be on the patient. With this in mind, then, we can
begin to find our moral response by answering the questions proposed
earlier, when we discussed the process of decision making.
Questions Related to the Medical Condition of the Patient

Is the procedure (supplying of nutrition and hydration) beneficial to the
patient in terms ofpreservation of life or restoration of health? Supplying
nourishment sustains life; it does not of itself restore health to a former
state. However, it is clearly beneficial in terms of preservation of life, since
death would be inevitable without it and life will continue with it.
Is it serving a life-saving purpose? There is no doubt about the fact that it
is, since the patient could not survive without it and is unable to supply it for
himself.
Is it adding a serious burden? In almost every case the answer is negative.
The means of supplying food in themselves are all relatively simple and barring complications - generally without pain.
Is death already imminent so that the proposed procedures (supplying of
nourishment, in this case) may add briefly to the life span in such a way as
simply to prolong the dying process without actually preserving life? The
pathological condition which has caused the persistent vegetative state or
which is concurrent with it may threaten imminent death. Or it may be such
as simply to make it impossible for the patient to care for himself. In this
latter case the condition would not in itself be immediately life-threatening,
but the lack of nourishment would be. Supplying nourishment would not
be an instance of simply prolonging the dying process without actually
preserving life. Life would be preserved at length and not merely
temporarily prolonged while waiting for an imminently terminal condition
18
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to complete its course.
Questions Related to the Internal Disposition of the Patient

Is the procedure a grave burden to the patient, and has that burden
become unbearable or intolerable? In terms of the gravity of any burden , it is
always the one who bears the burden who is in the best position to answer
this sort of question . In the present case, however, we are dealing precisely
with a patient who is incapable of giving any answer. So far as can be
determined by observation, the unconscious patient is not experiencing the
anguish that would be borne by a conscious person in' these or similar
circumstances. The parts of the brain responsible for the specifically human
qualities of anticipation and anguish that so affect human pain are precisely
those parts which are not now functioning. As to the intensity of any
physical pain due to the increased atrophy of muscle, the discomfort of
immobility, the feelings arising from various medical procedures, etc., there
would seem to be no way at the present time to render final and definitive
judgment, although the external signs in the unconscious patient do not
indicate excessive discomfort which cannot be relieved by those who have
charge of the patient's care.
The question as to whether the patient in the persistent vegetative state
feels pain is not an easy one to address, since the patient is the very one who
is incapable of answering any question about the situation. Some of the
problem, of course, is based on the way in which we view pain. There is a
distinction between pain as a physical sensation and pain as the affective
response associated with human suffering. 29 The response of the vegetative
patient to noxious stimuli would indicate that there is a physical response to
pain or discomfort. However, physical evidence also indicates that the
affective level of human suffering is not present. Experience with such
patients shows no behavioral indication of such suffering. Postmortem
examinations usually reveal a degree of damage to the cerebral hemispheres
sufficient to preclude the experience of suffering. PET scanning also shows
a metabolic rate in the cortex so reduced as to be incompatible with
consciousness.
We can say, therefore, that all appearances would generally seem to
indicate that there is no excessive pain involved in the feeding process. The
feeding procedures themselves, except where there may be some serious
complications, may involve some discomfort, but nothing excessive (this
can be determined from the reactions of conscious patients who for one
reason or another, have undergone such procedures). Feeding methods do
not generally carry with them the sometimes serious discomfort which
would be found in the patient on a respirator.
As to the discomfort of being in this condition for years, unable to
communicate and unable to help oneself, it is not possible to make a final
and decisive comment. If, indeed, the patient is unconscious then there is no
awareness of these inabilities and, consequently, none of the anguish that
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would attend them. However, we should note that some of what is being
said is conjecture, since we have no way of knowing what is going on in the
mind of the unconscious person. If we could indeed establish that there is
pain, and that there is, in fact, considerable pain, then our answers might be
quite different. That question, however, remains to be answered, although
present consensus argues against the existence of such pain, mental or
physical.3°
Questions Related to Family and Caregivers

What motives will enter into "substitutedjudgments" given by others on
behalf of the patient? There is no doubt that a family undergoes
considerable pain as it watches a loved one who remains for months or
years in the persistent vegetative state. It is not at all unusual that members
of that family find themselves , at times, wondering if death would not be a
better alternative for the one who is afflicted. This feeling can and does arise
out of love, compassion and concern for the sick person. It is also, almost
always, influenced as well by the internal struggle experienced by those who
are well. They experience the pain of loss as the person they love is now
removed from conscious communication with them. They experience their
own exhaustion if they are very directly involved in the care for the patient.
All of these are emotions that one would expect to find in such a situation.
The family members, however, must be careful not to allow their own fears
or frustrations to become the basis for the moral decision making that now
falls to them. They must exercise for the one who is ill the same stewardship
of life that is the obligation of each of us in our own regard. The desire to
escape from our own burdens cannot become the source of a decision which
would end the life of someone else.
There are, of course, other far less worthy motives which can inspire
people to decide to terminate nutrition for the unconscious patient. Anger,
spite, greed, culpable lack of concern and a host of other motivations can
also be part of our human decisions . For this reason it is also desirable that
the benefit of the doubt be given to the continued sustenance of the life of
the unconscious person.
We must, however, take into real account situations in which the family
has reached the moral limits of its abilities or its resources. In such a
situation, they have done all that they can do and they are not morally
obliged to do more. They would then have reached the limits of ordinary
means. However, in the society in which we live this does not present a fully
convincing argument. Resources are available from other sources and these
can often be tapped before a family reaches dire financial straits. Such
assistance has been and continues to be available.
Euthanasia or Allowing to Die
It would be unwise to complete our consideration of these questions
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without addressing the question of euthanasia. The word once referred to
the effort to help make one's dying process easier. It has come finally to refer
to some sort of intervention which actually brings about death.
Etymologically speaking, in ancient times euthanasia meant an easy death
without severe suffering. Today one no longer thinks of this original meaning of
the word, but rather of some intervention of medicine whereby the sufferings of
sickness or of the final agony are reduced, sometimes also with the danger of
suppressing life prematurely. Ultimately, the word euthanasia is used in a more
particular sense to mean "mercy killing," for the purpose of putting an end to
extreme suffering, or saving abnormal babies, the mentally ill or the incurably sick
from the prolongation, perhaps for many years, of a miserable life, which could
impose too heavy a burden on their families or on society.
It is necessary to state clearly in what sense the word is used in the present
document.
By euthanasia is understood an action or an omission which of itself or by
intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated.
Euthanasia's terms of reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the
will and in the methods used. 3l

Alleviation of suffering through the purposeful destruction of the life of
the sufferer is clearly contrary to true Christian respect for life and Christian
love of neighbor. Yet, in our own time, this solution is proposed more and
more frequently and even by doctors, whose very profession should be
geared to the preservation oflife.32 It has been said that in the Netherlands as
many as one-sixth of all deaths are attributable to euthanasia. 33
The movement toward murder as a solution to problems has already
begun in the societal attitude toward the killing of the unborn. It is rapidly
entering into the realm of the "hopelessly" ill. It can just as easily be
extended to include the seriously handicapped, either physically or
mentally. In none of these cases is it a question of the good of the patient,
but more a question ofthe exercise of a questionable autonomy founded in
equally questionable "rights" of the individual. Decisions such as this are all
too easily based on the desires or fears or even inconvenience of others and
the patient's wishes may not even enter into the question. That is certainly the
case with abortion, and canjust as easily become the case with the incurably
ill. In both cases the decision is based on an attitude that there is such a thing
as a human life not worthy to be lived. Those who are defective in some way
are destroyed rather than cared for. It is an attitude which easily
dehumanizes not only the victim' but the perpetrator as well. 34
In 1986 the Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association stated that "it is not unethical to discontinue all means
of life-prolonging medical treatment" for patients in irreversible comas.
This statement has the weight of whatever prestige that Council holds, even
though it was not the decision ofa referendum of the members and does not
tell us anything about how many of the members would support it. Nor
should one be misled into thinking that the statement is based on the fact
that such patients are suffering some sort of severe pain caused by the care
that is being given them. This has already been discussed above, with the
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conclusion that there is usually no excessive pain due to such feeding. In
fact, that same Council in 1990 said:
One aspect of the debate about stopping treatment in PVS focuses on a concern
that the afflicted person will experience suffering after treatment is stopped (e.g.,
will experience dyspnea after removal of a respirator or face discomfort
associated with starvation and dehydration after removal of a feeding tube.) The
most obvious contradiction to this projection is that, by definition, in PVS both
the person's capacity to perceive a wide range of stimuli and the neocortical or
higher brain functions, that are needed to generate a self-perceived affective
response to any such stimuli are destroyed. Pain cannot be experienced by brains
that no longer retain the neural apparatus for suffering. 3'

But if the pain of the inability to breathe or the pain of starvation and
dehydration cannot be felt, then there is no reason at all to support the
contention that the removal of nutrition and hydration is being done out of
concern for the sufferings of the patient. It must, therefore, be based upon
something else; and what is that something else if not the decision that the
life of this particular patient is not worth living? Sad to say, the intent is not
to relieve suffering but, rather, to cause the patient to die. Nor can it be
argued that it is merely the intention to "allow" the patient to die, rather
than to "cause his death." The patient in the persistent vegetative state is
not thereby in a terminal condition, since nutrition and hydration and
ordinary care will allow him to live for years. It is only if that care is taken
away - and barring any other new disease or debilitation - that the
patient will die. It is the removal of the nutrition and hydration that brings
about the death. This is euthanasia by omission rather than by positive
lethal action, but it is just as really euthanasia in its intent.
There is a vast difference between allowing a terminal patient to die and
doing something to hasten the death. We find no moral problem in those
situations in which treatments are withdrawn because they have become
an excessive burden rather than a benefit to the terminal patient. We find
no moral problem in the withdrawing even of nutrition and hydration
from the patient if the supplying of them is futile or excessively
burdensome 36 . It is morally wrong, however, to take these extreme cases
and make them the norm for all cases of persistent vegetative state
patients, when treatment or care will allow that patient to continue to live
and will do so without a burden of excessive pain or suffering. In such cases
their removal is tantamount to passive euthanasia (killing by omission).
Much of the contemporary discussion seems to have lost sight entirely of
the difference between allowing to die when no treatment or care can any
longer save the patient and murder by omission. Recalling the moral truth
that one is not obliged to employ means that are either futile or too
burdensome, but must never intentiomilly act against innocent human life,
we see a clear moral distinction between intending and allowing. The latter
is permissible in some circumstances - those involving extraordinary
means - the former is always immoral and therefore forbidden.
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Conclusion

As a general conclusion, in almost every instance there is an obligation to
continue supplying nutrition and hydration to the unconscious patient.
There are situations in which this is not the case, but those are the
exceptions and should not be made into the rule. We can and do offer our
sympathy and support to those who must make such hard decisions in those
difficult cases. We cannot and do not offer our support to those who are
willing to remove from patients the means of sustaining nourishment on the
ground that their lives are not worthy of our continued care and concern.
Respect for personal autonomy is a basic principle of medical ethics. This
principle reinforces the duty of hospital personnel to secure the consent of
patients or their surrogates before initiating or discontinuing treatment. It
does not reduce them to mere functionaries who can do no more than carry
out the orders of the patient or the patient's surrogate. The purpose of
medicine is no more the mere satisfaction of patients' or surrogates' desires
than the purpose of teaching is to give students only what they explicitly
desire to learn. As a student of medicine the physician has a knowledge of
health and the effects of disease. As a professional the physician is dedicated
to keeping patients healthy or, at least, to relieving their suffering. When
there are alternative treatments or courses of action, the physician will lay
out the advantages and disadvantages of the various choices, and show
respect for the autonomy of patients not by merely acceding to their wishes
but by telling them the truth and enabling them to make the right decisions.
Neither the patient nor the surrogates of the patient have the moral right to
withhold or withdraw treatment that is ordinary. Neither does the physician
have the right to do so simply because the patient or the surrogates ask or
demand this. In this perspective the physician responds to patient desires
only if those desires accord with the proper professional and moral
judgment as to what will promote the health, preserve the life or prevent the
suffering of the patient. The physician's duty has not been properly done if
there has been no effort to persuade the patient to follow the proper course
of action. If the patient decides to refuse excessively burdensome or futile
treatment, the physician may properly comply with the request. If the
patient decides to refuse ordinary treatment, there may, in some instances,
be little that the physician can do to prevent this, but there remains at least
the duty to attempt to persuade the patient otherwise or, failing that, for the
physician to remove himself from the case so as not to be guilty of
complicity in suicide.
It is important to recall that historically the practitioners and researchers
in medical science have steadfastly and, in some cases, heroically striven to
offer the very best of care to their patients. If some solution to a medical
problem were not available, they gave their time, energies and sometimes
even their lives and fortunes to find it, to invent it, to discover some way to
preserve their patients' lives and alleviate their suffering. It is our hope that
medical science will remain faithful to this wonderful heritage which has
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been of inestimable advantage to humanity. Using the talents that God has
given them, those who have dedicated their lives to providing health care to
their fellow human beings need to know that their work is respected and
valued by all of us. The fact that there remains so much to do, even though
so much has already been achieved, should not discourage them nor deter
them from the search for further solutions to problems that we still face.
New procedures may have to be found to resolve difficulties of suffering and
discomfort. Cost effective and affordable treatments and care need to be
developed so that the burden of caring . for the ill will not impoverish
families nor add unreasonably to their burdens. Diagnostic methods should
be studied so that we can begin to ascertain with better certainty the pain
that may actually be suffered by the unconscious. The tradition of health
science shows that physicians and nurses have not avoided solving
problems which human sickness and disease have presented in the past. We
are confident that that same tradition will inspire present and future health
care providers to do the same.
We ask also that those in the judicial and legislative fields bring their
expertise to bear on these cases and that they will do so with full attention
not only to the la w alone but to the basic norms of morality and full respect
for human life which ought to supply the proper basis for good law. Because
of new circumstances generated by medical and scientific advances, there
has been serious interest in advance medical directives such as the living will
and durable power of attorney. It is quite reasonable to want to leave
instructions regarding one's own health care in the event of incapacitation.
It is not necessary to submit to procedures which are truly extraordinary or
futile. But we caution all those involved in legislation and judgment that
laws must have their true foundation in those same principles which guide
our moral decisions . Recent court opinions have come very close to
agreeing that simply because the patient wishes, nutrition and hydration
can be discontinued, even when there is not a question of something that is
overly burdensom or simply futile to the patient. The law and legal
decisions should never be such as to encourage the removal of the essential
means of life and thus yield to a clear intent to bring about death and not
merely to the willingness to yield to the fact of human life that all must die
and that the day will come for each of us when this is inevitable. The laws
must be just and must be based on unequivocal principles which identify the
taking of innocent human life and make it illegal, with full recognition that
it is already immoral. We should be most cautious and develop these
principles very carefully since many of the arguments we have heard in
favor of the removal of nutrition and hydration from one group of patients,
those in the PVS for example, could easily be applied in the cases of other
groups, such as the retarded, the elderly, the incurably crippled, and any
other whose diseases modern medicine has not yet been able to cure. ·
Naturally, it would be irresponsible to stand by idly and let such a tragedy
occur.
Finally, we appeal to those whose loved ones are in this sad state of
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unconsciousness. We ask them to allow their pain to give life to an even
greater desire to serve those whom they love. We offer our support, our
consolation and our sympathy and we offer also our prayers and our
spiritual support. We ask them to trust in the mercy and goodness of God in
this situation just as they must do in every situation in life . We join with
them in accepting the joy and the burden of stewardship for God's gift of
life. We pray that they and we alike may hold lovingly to the gift of life itself,
so that when the time comes for us to leave this world and enter into the
fullest love of God, we may bring with us that deepest love of life which
begins here and finds its fulfillment there.
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